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Occasional Interventions to Target Rates
By KAREN K. LEWIS*
This paper develops a model of central-bank intervention based upon a policy
characteristic of foreign-exchange interventions by the United States, Germany,
and Japan in the late 1980's and evaluates it empirically. Central bankers
intervene with greater intensity as rates deviate from target levels, but they also try
to stabilize rates around current levels. The model is estimated using exchange
rates and data based upon observed central-bank interventions. Interestingly, the
estimates of the model are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model
for both the deutsche-mark / dollar rate and, less strongly, for the yen / dollar
rate. (JEL F41, G15, F31)

Governments frequently target macroeconomic variables through a mixed policy of
occasional interventions with otherwise
floating rates. This type of policy has been
particularly characteristic of foreignexchange market intervention since the end
of the Bretton Woods system. Within this
period, the "Louvre Accord" intervention
policy following the summit meeting in
February 1987 stands out as the most ambitious attempt to implement a system of coordinated central-bank intervention by the
United States and its trading partners. As
such, this policy provides a useful benchmark for considering the effects of intervention policies over other floating-rate periods
and, possibly, other markets, as well.
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between occasional interventions and

the behavior of rates, focusing upon the
Louvre period. I first show theoretically how
this type of intervention policy affects the
behavior of the exchange rate. A unique
feature of this model is that the behavior of
the exchange rate depends directly upon the
probability of intervention. I estimate this
probability of intervention and the model of
exchange-rate behavior. The basic theoretical predictions hold for the DM/$ exchange rate and, less strongly, for the yen/$
exchange rate.
The implications of the model are quite
intuitive. The Louvre intervention policy set
targeted levels for the DM/$ and yen/$
exchange rates. As exchange rates deviated
from these levels, the Group of Three (G-3)
central banks were supposed to intervene to
push rates back toward their targeted levels.1
Since traders were aware of the central
bankers' intentions, they expected movements in the exchange rate away from targeted levels to be offset with increasing
* Department of Finance, The Wharton School, 2300
likelihood as rates drifted from the target.
SH-DH, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
Thus, one implication of the model is that
19104-6367. I am grateful for helpful suggestions from
two anonymous referees, Giuseppe Bertola, William
the intensity of intervention induces exCleveland, Francisco Delgado, Frank Diebold, Avinash
pected reversion to target levels in the

Dixit, Bernard Dumas, Bob Flood, Ken Froot, Peter
Garber, Michael Klein, Paul Krugman, Maury Obstfeld,
Paolo Pesenti, Andy Rose, Lars Svensson, and from
seminar participants at Brown University, the University of Chicago, Dartmouth College, the International
Monetary Fund, the NBER Summer Institute, Princeton University, and Yale University. I am also grateful
for research support from the Olin Foundation and the
National Science Foundation under grant no. 8902794.
Of course, any errors are mine alone.

1The Group of Three (G-3) are the United States,
Germany, and Japan. Although other industrialized

countries at the summit also agreed upon the Louvre
Accord, most of the intervention was carried out by
these three countries.
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determinants of rates and, therefore, the
rates themselves. While this type of meanreversion has previously only been posited,
this model shows how the reversion depends directly upon parameters in the intervention policy.2 The empirical evidence indeed finds that the conditional mean of the
exchange rate depends upon the probability
of intervention.
A second feature of the intervention behavior comes from its stabilizing role. Although the central banks intervened with
greater intensity as exchange rates deviated
from their targeted levels, the interventions
appeared to stabilize rates around current
levels. As a result, the model predicts that
the conditional variance of the fundamental
variables, and hence of the exchange rate
itself, declines as the exchange rate deviates
from its targeted level. This conditionalvariance behavior depends upon the intervention probability, a relationship that I also
find empirically below.
An alternative description of intervention
policy over this period is that central bankers
maintained the exchange rate within a given
band around the targeted levels. Paul
Krugman (1991) has shown that if central
banks intervene with certainty at given
exchange-rate bands and if the market recognizes this policy, expectations of these
interventions will induce nonlinearities in
the relationship between the exchange rate
and its fundamental determinants. As shown
by Lars Svensson (1991), this target-zone
model also implies that the conditional variance of the exchange rate will decline as the
exchange rate nears the-bands. Thus, a finding that the conditional variance falls as the
exchange deviates from its target as implied
by the intervention model is also consistent
with the Krugman target-zone model.
To consider whether target bands are important over this period, I conduct tests of
nonlinearities in the exchange rate and fundamentals relationship. Based upon these

tests, I do not find any evidence against
linearity despite using quite different measures of fundamental variables. To check
whether the lack of evidence for nonlinearities is due to low power of the tests, I
estimate the model parametrically and then
use this model as a data-generating process
to conduct Monte Carlo experiments of the
test statistics. These experiments show that
nonlinearities induced by targeted bands
should have been picked up easily by the
tests. In other words, the tests are quite
powerful against this alternative. Thus, target bands do not appear to explain the
results.
In the absence of target bands, however,
the intervention policy itself implies that the
exchange rate remains a nonlinear function
of its fundamental determinants, raising the
question of why these nonlinearities are not
detected. Therefore, I conduct another set
of Monte Carlo experiments based on the
parametric model, but without imposing target bands. The experiments show that the
relationship implied by the intervention
model is sufficiently linear that the test
statistics are likely to be unable to detect
them.
Section I below presents the basic theoretical framework. Section II provides the
empirical evidence. Section III shows how
the occasional intervention model differs
from other models such as the Krugman
model. Concluding remarks follow.
I. Interventions and the Behavior of Rates

To provide a framework for the investigation, I will begin with a standard asset pricing relationship. Specifically, the asset price
depends both upon a set of fundamental
variables that influence its contemporaneous demand and supply and upon the expected future asset price. This relationship
is given by

(1) x(t) = f(t) + aEtf dx(t)} /dt

where x is the logarithm of the asset price,
f is a composite variable of the determi2Kenneth Froot and Maurice Obstfeld (1991) and
nants of the price, a parameterizes the
Francisco Delgado and Bernard Dumas (1992) assume
sensitivity of the asset price to its own exthat fundamentals follow a mean-revertin'g Ornsteinpected future change, dx is the change in
Uhlenbeck (OU) process.
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the price over the interval of time, and dt is
the interval of time. For this equation to
explain the exchange rate, x is defined as
the logarithm of the foreign-currency price
of a unit of domestic currency and f is a
measure of its fundamental determinants.3
Since equation (1) represents a first-order
differential equation in x, the exchange rate
can be solved in terms of fundamentals given
the process followed by fundamentals. A
standard assumption is that these fundamentals evolve according to a random walk,
possibly with drift. I will use this assumption
both to show how intervention will alter the
behavior of the standard fundamentals process and to contrast the intervention model
with conventional ones. This process is

(2) df = ,dt +(dz
where df f(t) - f(t - dt), ,u is a constant
drift term, and dz = z(t) - z(t - dt), where
z(t) is a random variable with increments
over the interval dt that are independent
and normally distributed with zero mean
and unit variance. To understand how intervention during the late 1980's would affect a
fundamentals process such as (2), I will first
describe this policy and then return to the
issue of solving the model.

A. G-3 Intervention Policy

and Exchange Rates: The Evidence
In 1985, the United States resumed foreign-exchange intervention after a hiatus of
five years covering the first Reagan administration. Figure 1 depicts the DM/dollar
and the yen/dollar exchange rates for the
period 1985-1987. To investigate the relationship between the exchange rates and
intervention over this period, these exchange-rate series were combined with series identifying days when foreign-exchange
traders observed one of the G-3 central

banks intervening. Intervention accounts
were also divided into dollar sales intended
to weaken the dollar and dollar purchases
to support the dollar. The intervention series were compiled for this study from daily
newspaper accounts from The New York
Times, Wall Street Journal, and the London
Financial Times.4 The daily exchange-rate
data are reported by the Bank of England
as collected by the International Monetary
Fund. These rates are quoted in London at
7:00 A.M. EST and are therefore observed
before the opening of the U.S. markets.
The figure illustrates the three periods of
intervention policy described by Kathryn
Dominguez (1990). The first period began
following a meeting of the G-5 countries at
the "Plaza Meeting" in September 1985
where the governments announced that a
fall in the value of the dollar was desirable.
Subsequently, the dollar declined dramatically against both the deutsche mark and
the Japanese yen. The second period began
with the Tokyo meeting on May 5, 1986, in
which Japanese officials were concerned
that the yen might strengthen too much. By
February 1987, the beginning of the third
intervention period, official concerns about
the weakness of the dollar led to the Louvre
Accord, an agreement among central banks
to stabilize exchange rates. Yoichi

Funabashi (1989) reports the target levels
immediately following the Louvre as DM
1.825/dollar and as Y153.5/dollar. The
yen/dollar rate was later rebased to
Y146/dollar. During the months following
the Louvre accord, exchange rates appeared
to be quite stable relative to the previous
two years. The upper right-hand panel of
Figure 1 shows this period in more detail,
including the midpoint of the yen/dollar
targets of Y149.8/dollar.
Table 1 describes summary statistics of
interventions by the Federal Reserve, the

4The exchange rate is determined by the private

3In standard exchange-rate models, f(t) is the commarket demand based upon currently available inforbination of factors that determine the flow supply
relative to demand for foreign exchange. In monetary
models, such as Michael Mussa (1982), a is the semielasticity of money demand.

mation. Since the market does not perfectly observe
the magnitudes of intervention, these data and not
actual intervention data are appropriate for the study.
See also footnote 6.
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FIGURE 1. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES AND G-3 INTER

TABLE 1-G-3 INTERVENTION, SUMMARY STATISTIC
Average level Average level Average level at

Proportion of total Average level at intervention at dollar sales dollar purchases

Period and bank days intervened DM Yen DM Yen DM Yen DM Yen
Total period (532 observations, 9/23/85-12/31/87):

Federal Reserve 0.077 2.02 162.5 2.36 194.1 1.79 141.5
Bundesbank 0.152 2.08 166.6 2.43 197.2 1.86 146.8
Bank of Japan 0.217 2.03 159.6 2.66 216.8 1.94 150.8

Combined 0.304 2.06 162.9 2.04 161.3 2.40 194.9 1.94 151.2

Plaza to Tokyo (157 observations, 9/23/85 - 5/4/86):

Federal Reserve 0.070 2.63 215.4 2.67 220.1 2.17 168.5
Bundesbank 0.178 2.60 211.3 2.65 215.5 2.33 184.8
Bank of Japan 0.172 2.50 201.2 2.65 216.7 2.25 175.0
Combined 0.255 2.45 195.5 2.53 203.4 2.64 215.3 2.28 178.6

Tokyo to Louvre (205 observations, 5/5/86 - 2/20/87):

Federal Reserve 0.101 2.03 159.8 - - 2.03 159.8
Bundesbank 0.087 1.99 155.9 2.05 154.0 1.98 156.0
Bank of Japan 0.204 2.11 160.8 - - 2.11 160.8
Combined 0.272 2.05 159.1 2.08 159.5 2.05 154.0 2.08 159.6

Louvre to crash (169 observations, 2/22/87-10/18/87):

Federal Reserve 0.124 1.83 146.6 1.87 151.4 1.81 144.3
Bundesbank 0.148 1.82 144.8 1.85 148.7 1.80 142.5
Bank of Japan 0.219 1.81 143.5 - - 1.81 143.5
Combined 0.314 1.82 146.0 1.82 144.9 1.85 149.4 1.81 143.6

Notes: The spot exchange rates are the DM/$ and yen/$ rates from the I
at 7:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time. The intervention data are observations
of Three central banks: the U.S. Federal Reserve, the German Bundesbank
combination of the three central banks. The columns labeled the "averag
yen/$ rates over the sample. "Average level at intervention" reports the av
place. The columns labeled "average level at dollar sales" and "average lev
rates at which central banks sold and bought dollars, respectively.
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Bundesbank, and the Bank of Japan over
spectively. Thus, when the dollar was weak
the full period and the three intervention
some interventions were dollar sales, and
periods. Central banks intervened frevice versa. These interventions may have
quently during the period. For the full samreflected attempts to stabilize fluctuations
ple, central-bank intervention by at least
around the exchange rate's current levels.
one of the three central banks, given by the Third, although the intervention events may
"combined" series, occurred 30.4 percent of
be observable by the market, the magnithe total days. Notably, central banks intertudes of these interventions are usually not.6
vened around a much tighter range of the
The first two features of intervention may
exchange rate following the Louvre agreebe incorporated into a simple rule. Suppose
ment than in previous periods. For example,
that the authorities wish to target a level of
from the Plaza to the Tokyo meetings, the
the exchange rate, defined as xo, and that
difference between the average DM/dollar
the fundamentals level determining this rate
rates where the Fed sold and purchased
is fo. For the sake of exposition, suppose
dollars was 0.6 DM (2.67-2.17) while the
the exchange rate is above the target level
same difference following the Louvre Acso that f > fo. Finally, suppose that central
cord was 0.06 DM (1.87- 1.81). Overall, the
bankers watch carefully the movements in
joint pattem of intervention and exchange
determinants of fundamentals to evaluate
rates suggests that greater exchange-rate
the effects upon the equilibrium exchange
stabilization coincided with more active inrate. Then, the rule may be described as
tervention.5

follows:

B. Characterizing Occasional
Intervention Policy

The evidence in Table 1 and Figure 1
suggests at least three basic features of
intervention behavior during the Louvre
Accord period. First, most interventions
appear to be directed toward preventing
exchange-rate movements away from a central level. For example, when the dollar was
weaker than its targeted level during the
Louvre Accord, interventions were usually
dollar purchases, and vice versa.
Second, a small proportion of intervention operations were in the opposite direction. For the interventions above or below
the target levels during the Louvre Accord
period, most but not all of the interventions
were dollar sales or dollar purchases, re-

(3) if f moves away from fo, buy domestic
currency with probability r, do nothing with probability 1- u;

if f moves toward fo, sell domestic
currency with probability 1d, do noth-

ing with probability 1-1rd

where 7u >1 .d* A symmetric argument
holds for fundamentals below fo.

This intervention policy clearly incorporates the first two empirical features noted

above: (i) rates are targeted back toward

their levels with probability rru, and (ii)

exchange-rate movements toward the target
level are counteracted with a lower proba-

bility, 7T '. Below, I will call iru and ird the

outward and inward intervention probabilities, respectively.
The third feature requires making an
identifying assumption about the unobservable magnitudes of interventions. Since central bankers are responding to market forces

5The pattern may seem surprising since the interventions' effects upon the domestic money supply are
frequently sterilized by the G-3 central banks and since
studies such as Lewis (1988) and Kenneth Rogoff (1984)
indicate that sterilized interventions should have no
effect. However, evidence in Lewis (1995) suggests that
6Using a continuous stream of Reuters screen data,
the automatic operating procedures by the Federal
Charles Goodhart and Thomas Hesse (1991) find that
Reserve may induce a lag in the sterilization process.
the intraday volumes of intervention are generally not
See Hali Edison (1993) for a survey of intervention
detectable with the exception of the Bank of Japan

studies.

interventions for some episodes.
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upon the exchange rate, the true intervention magnitudes should reflect the current
movement in demand relative to supply for
foreign exchange. To characterize this intervention, I will assume that central bankers
buy or sell sufficient currency to offset the
incipient movement in the exchange rate.
To see how this intervention affects the
fundamentals behavior, consider the standard random-walk process in (2) typically
assumed for fundamentals in the absence
of intervention. Suppose that the interval
dt equals 1. Then, defining w(t)-z(t)z(t - 1), the fundamentals process together
with intervention can be written as

(4) f (t) - f (t - 1)
= f(t) - f(t - 1) + a(t)
= /I + Ouw(t) + a(t)
where a(t) is - [ ,u + 0 w(t)] when intervention occurs and 0 otherwise. The magnitude
of intervention at time t equals a(t), the
quantity of either domestic currency sales

and where rr is everywhere continuously
differentiable on f E [ f, f ]. The variables f
and f are the supports of the distribution
of fundamentals and can lie anywhere on
the real line, including ( - oo, oo), when ,u = 0.
Intervention occurs with probability
7rr(f(t)). Note that this function has the
feature that the outward intervention probability is greater than the inward interven-

tion probability since for f > fo, w'(f) > 0,
and conversely for f < fo. Also, iT is clearly
minimized at fo. Equation (5) also states

that the probability of the intervention is
strictly less than 1.
The fundamentals process resulting from
the distortions introduced by intervention

can be derived using the underlying fundamentals process in the absence of intervention in (2) together with the probability
function. Appendix A shows that the continuous time limit of the fundamentals process
generated by equations (3), (4), and (5) is a
diffusion process given by

(6)
(if df is negative) or purchases (if df is
positive) that offsets the incipient foreign-

df ={[l1-(f)] _-2,T(f))dt

exchange demand. The assumptions in (3)
+ Ocrl - ( dz
and (4) together imply that intervention will
target the exchange rate around a given
target level .(since rrd <TU) and that the
where dz is the increment to a Wiener
exchange rate will be stabilized around curprocess. In Appendix B, I derive the starent levels when interventions occur.
tionary limiting distribution of this process.7
This process has an intuitive interpretaC. Intervention-Distorted Fundamentals
tion. First, the conditional mean is
To compare the intervention model with

other models in the literature that may explain the empirical results found below, the
model must be developed in continuous
time. For this purpose, it will be convenient
to treat the inward and outward probabili-

(7) E(df) ={4[j-T(f)] -2T(f))dt
and has two components. The first term

comes from the effect of the drift term, A,

ties, Td and iTu, as part of the same contin- in the fundamentals process without inter-

uous probability function. This probability

function can be written as iT(f ), where

vention. If intervention occurs, the change
in fundamentals is zero. Therefore, the con-

(5) O< '(f)<oo forfo<f<f
-oo<r (f) <0 forf<f<fO
'Ir(f) < 1 forall fE[f,f

7The Appendix shows that when ,= 0, the asymptotic distribution of (6) with reflecting barriers
at (f,f) is as follows: p(f)=A[1- r(f)] where

A = f/[1 - 1T )] d; is a normalizing constant.
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ditionally expected drift is ,u[1 - i(f)].
The the expected change in the exSubstituting

second term appears because interventions
prevent incipient exchange-rate movements
away from the target level more frequently
than movements toward the target. Since

decreases in If - fo I are less likely to prompt
intervention than increases, this policy induces mean-reversion in fundamentals given

by - o'2i'(f ). The gradient fT'(f) drives

the mean reversion because it is locally the
difference between the outward and inward
probabilities of intervention, ffu - fd. The

change rate in (9) for E(dx) in (1) gives
(10) X(f)

=f + a( 1,[1 - 1t(f cr 2.7T'(f )}X'
+ 2a ru2[1 - T(f)]X"(f).
Equation (10) is a second-order differen-

tial equation in X(f ) and therefore is
unique only up to two boundary conditions.
These conditions are provided by intervenother term, 0.2, measures how much vari- tion policy at the boundaries as exchange
ability in incipient foreign-exchange derates get far away from the target levels.
mand is expected to occur within the
For instance, the assumption that the experiod. Thus, in the absence of drift
A, rate is freely floating except for occhange
intervention policy will tend to keep the
casional interventions provides one pair of
exchange rate from wandering away from
boundary conditions. Alternatively, the polthe target level.
icy discussion during the Louvre period deThe conditional variance of the process in
scribed by Funabashi (1989) also suggests a
(6) is
set of boundary conditions. Specifically, in
addition to stabilizing rates around the tar(8) E(df2) = 0.2[1- ir(f)J dt.
get levels, the Louvre Accord stated that
interventions should keep the exchange
Since the probability of stabilizing interven- rates from exceeding 21-5-percent bands
tion increases with deviations from the tar- around these levels. Krugman (1991) points
get level, the conditional variance decreases
out that, if intervention is known to keep
with these same deviations. The intuition
exchange rates from exceeding a given level,
behind the conditional variance is straightthen at this point the expected change in
forward. In the discrete-time analogue in
the exchange rate is zero. This result im-

(4), when intervention occurs, the variance
plies that a policy of keeping the exchange
is zero. Therefore, the variance is the prob-rates within the supports of the distribution

ability of no intervention, 1- IT, times the
variance in the absence of intervention, .2.
D. Intervention Policy and the

Equilibrium Exchange Rate
I can now describe the exchange-rate solution using the intervention-distorted fundamentals process derived above. The exchange-rate solution can be written as a

function x = X(f), assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. In this case,
applying Ito's lemma to X(f) using the process of fundamentals in (6) gives
(9) dx = ({ {1- IT(f)]- U2 r'(f)}X'(f)

given by f and f would imply that

xi(f) = X'() = .
Alternatively, for a policy of free float except for occasional interventions, the sup-

ports (f,f) will be infinite. Below, I will

describe the solution with target bands and
the effects of these bands becoming arbitrarily large.

Solving the model in (10) requires specify-

ing a probability function for intervention.
For now, I will describe the solution for
arbitrary probability functions. Given this
function and two boundary conditions, the
equation can be solved numerically. In Sec-

tion II, I will estimate this probability func+ 2 .2[1 - _T(f )]X"(ftion
)) dt
using intervention data.

+ all - IT(f )X'(f ) dz.

The upper panel of Figure 2 describes
this solution for the case where the bound-
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natural case in which the points of reflecting barriers on fundamentals, (f,f), coincide with the level of fundameiitals where
the probability of intervention, w-, is arbitrarily close to 1.
Xk (f ) - 2&k - X:f

By contrast, the curve labeled 1- T2(f

depicts a case for which the points of reflecting barriers on fundamentals have intervention probabilities significantly far from

1. The exchange-rate solution labeled X2(f)
XIM~~~~~~~~~f

aries of f f a
g ? Xl-rl(f)~~~r(f

in the top half of Figure 2 illustrates the
resulting exchange-rate solution. Since the
probability function does not rise as quickly,
the authorities intervene with less intensity.
As a result, fundamentals are allowed more
variation, resulting in a higher discounted
present value of expected future fundamen-

tals when f > 0, and a lower present value
when f < 0. Thus, the exchange-rate bands

are wider at (x2, x2) than for the case with a

higher probability of intervention, (xj, .T?).

X1(f). This solution corresponds to the intervention model when target bands are imposed. For illustrative purposes, the probability function 7r was assumed to be the
uniform distribution, and it was defined over

f2, to make fn symmetric around fo, set
equal to zero. At the upper boundary,
traders know intervention will prevent the

As the figure summarizes, for given parameters a, ,u, and o- from the fundamentals
process, a range of solutions exist that depend upon the probability-of-intervention
function.
Equation (10) was also solved for increasingly wider bands of (f, f). As these bands
get wider, the exchange-rate function becomes highly linear. Whether bands or a
relatively free float are the appropriate
boundary conditions is an empirical question that will be investigated below.
II. Empirical Evidence on Intervention
Policy and Targeting Rates

exchange rate from depreciating further.
Therefore, they bid up the value of domestic currency relative to foreign currency at
every lower positive value of fundamentals;

The previous section showed that an intervention process characteristic of foreignexchange intervention policy by the G-3
during the late 1980's would distort the beand vice versa for negative fundamentals.
havior of foreign-exchange supply relative
This trading behavior comes from the
to demand. It also demonstrated how the
knowledge that intervention will prevent exchange-rate
the
solution depends directly
exchange rate from exceeding the bands,
upon the probability of intervention. This
giving the solution in Figure 2 much of its
probability can be estimated empirically.
nonlinear form. The lower panel of Figure 2
Estimating the probability function in

shows how the exchange-rate behavior determs of fundamentals, -T(f), would require
pends upon the probability of no intervenknowledge of all of the ingredients that
tion, 1- fr. The curve labeled 1- nel(f) coraffect demand and supply of foreign exresponds to the exchange-rate solution
change, as well as the function that links
X1_(f). This probability function describes
a
them
together. Since it is well known that

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 85 NO. 4 LEWIS: OCCASIONAL INTERVENTIONS TO TARGET RATES 699

this composite fundamental variable is quite
difficult to measure, I will treat it implicitly
through the exchange-rate solution. For this
purpose, recall that the equilibrium exchange rate is given by the monotonically
increasing function, X(f ). Thus, in equilibrium, any given fundamentals level, f *, implies a corresponding exchange rate, and
vice versa so that

(11) x*=X(f*)= ff*=X-1(x*)
where X-1(x) is the inverse function of
X(f). Therefore, the probability of intervention may be written as an equilibrium
function of the exchange rate by substituting the inverse function in (11) for fundamentals in the probability function:

(12) ( f*) = 7(X-l(x*))--r*(x*).
Using the exchange-rate levels where intervention occurred, the probability function
can be estimated empirically without specifying the fundamentals variables.8 The following subsection provides empirical estimates of the intervention probability as a
function of the exchange rate.

terized empirically in units of the level of
the exchange rate, st exp(xt), rather than

the logarithm of the exchange rate, x,. As in
equation (12), this probability can be related back to fundamentals:

(12') 7(f*)= 7T(X-l(ln(s*))) 7T'(s*).
Since ln(s,) is a monotonic function, estimates of rs(s,) can be easily mapped into
7 *(x,), a procedure I follow throughout the

analysis below.

The multinomial logistic distribution over
the three possible intervention events provides a relatively good fit of the intervention
data. This probability distribution is given
by

(13a) ln{Pr(It = - 1)/Pr(It = 1))
= Co + CiSt-i

(13b) ln{Pr(It = O)/Pr(It = 1))
= go + g1st-1

where co, c1, go, and g1 are parameters to

be estimated.9 The probabilities are based
upon the lagged exchange rate in order to
minimize potential endogeneity problems.
A. Estimating the Intervention Probability
Note that these equations are intended to
as a Function of the Exchange Rate
provide estimates for the model above and
should not be viewed as reaction functions.
I consider three possible events, defined
Clearly, additional variables could affect the
as I, which may occur on any given day, t:
likelihood of intervention, but these variI, = 0 for "no intervention," I, = 1 for "inables should also be present in the exchange
tervention to weaken the dollar" (dollar
rate through the equilibrium relationship in
sales), and I, = - 1 for "intervention to sup(11).
port the dollar" (dollar purchases). SumThe parameters in the probability funcmary results concerning these series during
tion (13) can be used to determine whether
the period 1985-1987 are provided
the probability of intervention is increasing
in Table 1.
with deviations from a target level, as imTo match these observations with the
plied by the intervention model. In (13a), a
model above, a form for the intervention
fall in the price of dollars should increase
probability must be specified. This interventhe probability of interventions to buy doltion probability appears to be better characlars relative to the probability of interven-

81 will also empirically examine the exchange-rate
solution allowing for different assumptions about fundamentals.

9For details on the multinomial logistic model, see
G. S. Maddala (1983).
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TABLE 2-PROBABILITY OF INTERVENTION ESTIMATES FOR THE LOUVRE PERIOD

(Pr(I=-1) (Pr(t =0)
' Pr(It = 1) J l Pr(I, = 1) +
A. DM/Dollar:

Pr(It =-1) Pr(I = 0)
Percentage Mean Target Mean Target Estimated

Central bank c0 c1 go g1 predicted DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ DM1.82/$ target
Federal 156* -84* 127* -67* 85.8 0.12 0.12 0.87 0.87 1.85
Reserve (40) (21) (34) (18)
Bundesbank 144* - 79* 79* -41* 85.2 0.02 0.02 0.97 0.97 1.82
(33) (18) (24) (13)

Bank of Japana - - 51* -29* 77.5 0.14 0.14 0.86 0.86 (15) (8)

Combined 125* - 68* 77* - 40* 68.0 0.05 0.05 0.94 0.94 1.83
(27) (15) (22) (12)

B. Yen/Dollar: Pr(It =-1) Pr(It =0)
Percentage Mean Target Mean Target Estimated

Central bank c0 cl go g1 predicted Y146.0/$ Y149.8/$ Y146.0/$ Y149.8/$ target
Federal 66.7* -0.45 * 55.1* -0.35* 87.6 0.05 0.03 0.94 0.91 147.0
Reserve (22.8) (0.15) (20.6) (0.14)
Bundesbank 58.5* -0.40 * 23.0t -0.14t 85.2 0.07 0.03 0.86 0.86 147.0
(17.4) (0.12) (12.3) (0.08)

Bank of Japana - - 26.8 * -0.19 * 79.3 0.28 0.16 0.72 0.84 (7.6) (0.05)
Combined 51.1* - 0.34 * 26.3 * - 0.16 * 69.2 0.17 0.09 0.78 0.83 150.4
(13.2) (0.09) (11.5) (0.08)
Notes: Each equation was estimated by multinomial logit with 169 observations for the period February 22, 1987, to
October 18, 1987. The columns headed by coefficients report the estimates, with the standard errors in parentheses. The
column labeled "percentage predicted" reports the goodness-of-fit test described in Maddala (1983) and is the percentage

of observations correctly predicted by the model. The "Pr(It = -1)" and "Pr(It = 0)" columns give the estimated probab

ties of interventions of dollar purchases and no intervention, respectively, at given exchange rates. These exchange rates are

either the means over the period (under "mean") or the official target levels (under "target"). (The target level for Japan is
the midpoint between the initial and rebased targets. ) These probabilities are calculated by substituting the exchange-rate
levels into the multinomial logit equations at the top of the table. The final column, "estimated target," gives the estimate

of the exchange rate at which the intervention probability is minimized: s = [ln(gl /c1 - gl)- col/cl.

aReported estimates do not include I = 1 since there were no dollar sales. Equations were: ln(Pr(It = 0)/Pr(It= -1

go + gst- 1*
tStatistically significant at the 10-percent marginal significance level.
*Statistically significant at the 5-percent marginal significance level.

tions to sell dollars. Therefore, the model

The minimum of this probability function

can also be used to determine an implied
predicts that cl < 0. In (13b), a fall in the
price of dollars should reduce the probabiltarget level: s0 = exp(x.). Minimizing the
ity of interventions to sell dollars relative to

probability of intervention from equations

no intervention, implying g, <0. Finally, (13) gives the exchange-rate level:

subtracting (13b) from (13a) gives the probability of buying dollars relative to no intervention. A fall in the price of dollars should
increase the probability of buying dollars
relative to no intervention, implying that

1c11>1gl.

ln(g /(c1 - g1))- Co

(14) so =

Cl

Table 2 reports the parameter estimates
of the probability function for the yen/dol-
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lar rate and for the DM/dollar rate, during

whether the exchange-rate model in the ab-

the Louvre period.'0 As the results show, thesence of bands can provide sufficiently
model provides a fairly good fit. The coefficients for all of the central banks and the
combined intervention equations are significantly different than zero and have the anticipated signs and magnitudes. The table
also reports the estimates of the intervention probabilities implied by substituting the
mean exchange-rate levels and the official
target levels, respectively, into equation (13).
Finally, the last column shows the target
levels implied by substituting the estimated
parameters into equation (14). For the
deutsche mark, the combined minimum intervention probability levels are near the
official target of 1.825 DM/dollar and the
yen estimate lies near Y149.8/dollar,
the midpoint between the original and the
later rebased targets.
In sum, these results corroborate the view
that the probability of intervention was an
increasing function of the deviation between exchange rates and their target levels
following the Louvre Accord. Below, I will
use these estimates to examine the relationship between the exchange rate and its implicit fundamentals.
B. Were There Credible Target Bands?
Evidence Based Upon Nonlinearity Tests
When target bands are credibly enforced
by intervention, the exchange rate will respond less than proportionally to movements in fundamental variables, as illustrated in Figure 2. This basic relationship is
consistent with all models that assume
known target bands. Without credible bands,
however, the exchange rate depends only
upon the daily movements of fundamentals
including occasional interventions.
In this subsection, I will test for nonlinearities in the exchange-rate function that
arise from target bands. The presence of
the intervention probability function itself
im-plies nonlinearities, even in the absence
of bands. Therefore, I will also consider

strong nonlinearities to be detected by these
tests.

Testing for Nonlinearities.-William Cleveland and Susan Devlin (1988) propose a test
of nonlinearities based upon "locally
weighted regression"(LWR) against the null

hypothesis of a linear regression."1 The test
is a modified F test of two alternative models. The linear model is a simple linear
regression over all sample points and comprises the null hypothesis. The alternative
nonlinear LWR model estimates a linear
relationship for each data point weighted by
a window of its nearest observations as
measured by the units of the variables. In
this way, the LWR traces out general nonlinear relationships. If the nonlinear relationship provides a better fit than does the
linear one, then the sum of squared errors
will be lower for this model, and the F test
will reject the hypothesis that the models
are the same. Below, I call this F test the
C-D (Cleveland-Devlin) test.
This methodology can be used to examine
the importance of targeted bands in the
intervention model. To see how, note first
that the exchange-rate process evolves according to the general form: dx = mX dt +

ox dz, where mx is the conditional mean

and ax is the conditional standard devia-

tion, and where, from (9), assuming , = 0,12

(15a) mx= - a2'(f)X'(f)

+ 4U2[1_- r(f)]X"(f)

IlRichard Meese and Andrew Rose (1990, 1991)

and Frank Diebold and James Nason (1990) use this
test to examine nonlinearities in the level of the exchange rate over different time periods, finding results
consistent with this paper.
2 When ,u was allowed to differ from zero in the
tests, the estimates were very poorly behaved, apparently due to multicollinearity. However, the empirical
'0Lewis (1990) shows that this specification fits
the will allow for the potential presence of a
analysis

other periods in Table 1 as well.

constant drift term.
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To construct tests for nonlinearities due
X'(f) will not be a constant and X"(f) # 0,
to target bands in the conditional mean, it is so that the exchange rate will be a nonlinear
important to examine the sources of nonlinfunction of v*' in (16).
earities. The mean in (15a) is nonlinear in
Implementing the nonlinearity test refundamentals both because the probability
quires a measure for fundamentals. Since
ir(f) is a nonlinear function and because
these variables are unobservable, I use three
X(f) is nonlinear. As described above, much different measures and check the robustof the nonlinearity in X(f ) derives from the ness of the results. The first measure is
potential effects of target bands. As the
based upon the monetary model which
bands become arbitrarily large, X(f) bemaintains that exchange rates are detercomes relatively linear. However, some linmined by relative monetary policies across
earity remains even in the absence of target
countries. As daily data on money supplies
bands because of the form of the intervenare not available, I use interest rates that
tion probability.
central banks monitor for monetary policy.
To examine whether nonlinearities arisThe rates are the federal funds rate for the
ing primarily from bands are important while
United States, the Lombard rate for Geralso allowing for nonlinearities due to the
many, and the call money rate for Japan.13
intervention probability, I constructed a
The second measure is motivated by
pseudo-linear null hypothesis. Specifically,
Robert Flood and Rose (1993) who identify
note that as X(f) becomes close to linear,
"virtual fundamentals" as the fundamentals
X'(f) becomes relatively constant and
level implied by the discrete-time form of

X"(f) approaches 0. Retaining nonlinearityequation (1): ft = x, - aE,Ax,. To obtain a
in the absence of target bands due to the
derivative of the intervention probability,
this null hypothesis can be written as

measure of E,Axx, I regressed Ax on the

difference between Eurocurrency interest
rates for the dollar, deutsche mark, and yen
from the London Financial Times and used
the fitted values. For a, I considered a
range from 0 to 3.
(16) (xt-xt,-)=ao+ai1r*(xt-_)+ut
Panel A of Table 3, reports marginal significance levels of the null hypothesis that
the conditional mean of the exchange rate is
where ao = 0 and a1 = - a2[X'(f)]2.
Under the null hypothesis that X'(f) is
linear in the derivative of the probability of
constant, equation (16) represents a linear
intervention. To calculate the probability of
regression since the derivative of the proba- intervention series, I use the form of the
bility is treated as data. Equation (16)
probability function defined in equation (13)
rewrites the probability process as a funcand impose the estimates of the parameters
tion of the exchange rate and uses the fact
obtained in Table 2 from the combined
that in equilibrium 7r'(f) = 7r*'(x)X'(f).
intervention. Appendix C explains in detail
Since the derivative of the probability is a
how the probabilities and their derivatives
nonlinear function, X'(f ) obviously cannot are constructed from the parameter estibe literally constant even in the absence of
mates.
hard target bands. However, I will show
The columns in Table 3A specify the funbelow that the degree of nonlinearities indamental variable used. The Clevelandduced by the probability function would not
be sufficient to reject linearity even though
the nonlinearity implied by target bands
would be. Therefore, this test should be
viewed as a test for the presence of hard
13These data are from the Bank of International
bands around the target level, not as a genSettlements. The tests, as well as parametric estimates
eral test of nonlinearities. As the alternative
discussed in the Appendix, were also conducted using
hypothesis, if target bands induce nonlinearthe call money rate in Germany without affecting the
ities in the exchange-rate process, then
main conclusions.
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TABLE 3-TEsTs FOR NONLINEARITIES FROM INTERVENTION MODEL

A. Cleveland-Devlin Tests for Null Hypothesis of "Linear"Conditional Mean
DM/$ fundamentals Yen/$ fundamentals
Virtual

Virtual

Monetary a =0 a=3 Monetary a =0 a =3

Marginal significance level: 0.601 0.329 0.602 0.225 0.216 0.383
Number of observations: (104) (138) (61) (75) (77) (61)

B. Probability of Insignificant Cleveland-Devlin

DM/$ Yen/$
Bands Present

Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 0.000
Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 0.000
Bands Not Present
Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.862 0.954
Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 10 percent: 0.775 0.911

Proportion of times marginal=significance level greater than estimate: 0.243 0.781

Notes: For panel A, the entries are the marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that Ax

linear given the fundamentals in the column. These levels are the minimums over a grid search of neighborhood

windows ranging from 0.4 to 0.9 times the sample size, as described in Cleveland and Devlin (1988). The numbers of
parentheses are the numbers of observations in the window of the minimum marginal significance level.
Panel B reports the results of Monte Carlo experiments on monetary fundamentals. The intervention model is
estimated parametrically as described in the Appendix. Using these estimates and imposing the assumption of
bands at the maximum exchange-rate levels over the sample, exchange rates and fundamentals were drawn for the

length of the sample and Cleveland-Devlin statistics (C-D) were calculated. The rows of the table report the
proportion of times out of 1,000 replications that the C-D F statistic from the generated model had a marginal
significance level greater than 5 percent, greater than 10 percent, and greater than the estimates in panel A for
"monetary."

Devlin test requires specifying a proportion
q of the sample size as the local window
around each observation for estimating the
LWR. Following Meese and Rose (1991), I
conducted each test repeatedly over a grid
search from q = 0.4 to q = 1 in increments
of 0.1. The entries in the table report the
minimum marginal significance level for the
F tests found over this grid search. As such,
they provide the strongest evidence possible
against linearity. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of observations in the
windows.
As the entries show, there is no evidence
against linearity for either currency or for
any of the extreme measures of fundamentals. This evidence suggests that the exchange rate is close to a linear function in
fundamentals. Apparently, the market did

not believe that central bankers would intervene with certainty at the target bands

suggested by the Louvre Accord.'

There are two potential problems with
this evidence, however. First, the test may
have poor power for detecting nonlinearities arising from the target bands. Second,
the derivative of the probability is clearly a
nonlinear function of fundamentals, raising
the question of why this source of nonlinearity is not detected by the test. I will
describe Monte Carlo evidence on these
two questions next.

14With different methodology, Michael Klein and
Lewis (1993) similarly find that the intervention policy
of the G-3 central banks following the Louvre Accord
was inconsistent with given target bands.
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Can the Test Detect the Nonlinearities
These two results Imare not inconsistent,
plied by Target Bands?-To ask whether the
however, if the degree of nonlinearity imlack of evidence against linearity in panel A
plied by the probability of intervention withof Table 3 was due to a lack of power, I first
out target bands is sufficiently weak that it
estimated parametrically the conditional
cannot be detected by the C-D tests. To
mean in equation (15). The Appendix proconsider this possibility, I conducted anvides details about this estimation. I then
other set of Monte Carlo experiments. I
imposed reflecting barriers on the exchange used the same estimated model as above
rate at the maximum levels of exchange
but did not impose the target-zone barriers.
rates observed over the period. Using this
I then generated data from this model for
model as the data-generating process, I rethe length of the data sample and calcupeatedly drew observations for sample sizes
lated the C-D statistic 1,000 times.
corresponding to the data set and calcuThe second part of Table 3B reports the
lated the C-D statistic 1,000 times.
proportion of times that the marginal signifThe first part of panel B of Table 3
icance level exceeded the 5-percent and 10(under "bands present') reports the proporpercent levels and the proportion of times it
tion of times that the statistic exceeded the
exceeded the estimate reported in panel A.
5-percent marginal significance level using
Interestingly, the marginal significance level
monetary fundamentals.'5 Panel B also re- exceeded 10 percent at least 77 percent of
ports the proportion of times in the Monte
the time. Thus, even though nonlinearties
Carlo experiments that the statistic exwere present from the probability function,
ceeded the marginal significance level rethe C-D statistic would not provide rejecported in panel A. As the evidence shows,
tions at least 77 percent of the time.
the marginal significance levels of the test
Even in the case of the DM/$ rate for
for nonlinearities arising from target bands
which the marginal significance level was
were always less than 5 percent and there0.601 in panel A, panel B says that exfore clearly less than either 10 percent or
change rates with nonlinearities arising
the estimates in panel B. This evidence insolely from the intervention probability
dicates that nonlinearities arising from tarwould have marginal significance levels exget bands implied by the Louvre Accord
ceeding this level 24 percent of the time.
should have been easily detected by the
This evidence therefore reconciles the apC-D test. For this reason, the evidence in
parent inconsistency posed above. The C-D
panel B suggests that nonlinearities arising
statistic is sufficiently powerful to detect
from these bands are very unlikely to be
nonlinearities in the exchange rate arising
present.
from target bands, but not to detect those
arising from the probability of intervention
Can the Test Detect the Nonlinearities Im- alone. Estimates of this relationship below
plied by the Intervention Policy?-The rewill verify that the exchange rate is a relamaining problem with the nonlinearity tests tively linear function of fundamentals when
comes from the probability of intervention. the potential nonlinearities arise from the
The evidence in Table 3A indicates that the
probability of intervention.
exchange-rate function is relatively linear in
fundamentals. Yet at the same time the
C. The Intervention Model Without
exchange rate is a linear function of the
Credible Target Bands
derivative of the intervention probability,
itself a nonlinear function of fundamentals.
Strictly speaking, the intervention model

implies that X'(f ) is nonlinear; but the
simulations reported in Table 3 indicate that
such nonlinearity is very difficult to detect. I
15Virtual fundamentals are measured as an identity
therefore estimate the model assuming that
in terms of the exchange rate, so parametric estimation

X'(f)
of the exchange rate against this measure is not possible.

is constant. This approach has the

advantage that the conditional mean and
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TABLE 4-JOINT ESTIMATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND INTERVENTION
DM/$
p

Yen/$

value

p

value

Parameters Individual Joint (Ho: 8 = 1) Individual Joint (Ho: 8 = 1)
ao -0.018 -0.227 - 0.134t -0.446

(0.041) (0.249) (0.075) (0.566)

(O,Xt)2 0.021* 0.003* 0.034t 0.003b
(0.011) (< 0.001) (0.019) (0.001)

ln( oX')2 -1.136 - 1.179* - 1.498* - 1.140*
(0.855) (0.026) (0.460) (0.251)
f3 0.480t 1.595* 0.262 0.360 0.924 0.910
(0.262) (0.529) (0.240) (0.675)

CO 125.700* 128.460* 51.140* 49.230*
(26.690) (3.250) (13.190) (6.060)

cl - 67.970* - 69.600* - 0.341* - 0.327*
(14.510) (1.740) (0.090) (0.042)

go 76.230* 75.210* 26.100* 24.650*
(22.490) (1.150) (11.560) (3.510)

91 - 40.210* - 39.610* - 0.161* -0.151*
(12.160) (0.620) (0.080) (0.025)

Notes: The table reports the estimates of the parameters given on the left-hand side
using one-step maximum likelihood for the system of equations given by (13), (16), and

(17). The standard errors are in parentheses. The entries under "individual" give the
results based upon estimating the conditional mean (16), variance (17), and probability
equations (13) separately. Those under "joint" are based on estimating them jointly.
Estimates in the conditional-mean equation are multiplied by 100 to convert them into

percentage change. The columns labeled "p value (Ho: , = 1)" give the marginal

significance levels for the hypothesis that 13 = 1 in the joint equation. All equations
are estimated with the combined intervention series from February 22, 1987, to
October 18, 1987.

tStatistically significant at the 10-percent marginal significance level.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent marginal significance level.

variance of the exchange rate can be estimated without requiring that fundamentals
be specified.

When X(f) is linear, the conditional moments in (15) reduce to (16) for the mean

individually, while the "joint" column entries are the results of estimating the intervention, mean, and variance equations
jointly by maximum likelihood.16 The joint
estimation uses the relationship across

equations (16) and (17) that exp(bo) = a1.

and

(17) u2 = exp(bo) [1-,T*(xt-1)] et

The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
The results point to several interesting

for the variance, where bo = log[ c- 2X'(f )2features. First, the constant ao is not signifiand ,3 = 1 and where et is assumed to be cantly different from zero at the 5-percent

lognormally distributed with a mean of unity.
The form of the probability function was
given in equations (13). The derivation of
7T*(x) from the parameters of the logistic
function are detailed in Appendix C.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the intervention model in (13) together with the conditional mean in (16) and variance in (17).
The "individual" column entries report the
results based upon estimating each equation

level and is significant at the 10-percent

level only for the individual yen/$ equation.
All of the other parameters are significantly
different from zero at the 5-percent level

16The equations were estimated jointly by one-step
maximum likelihood, beginning with the initial consistent estimates from the individual equation estimates
in Table 3.
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FIGURE 3. CONDITIONAL MEANS AND VARIANCES OF ExCHANGE RATEs BASED ON INTERV

Note: The graphs are constructed from the estimates in Table 4.

with the exception of / for the yen/$ exchange rate. Furthermore, ,3 is insignificantly different from 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the implications of
these estimates for the exchange-rate behavior. The top panels depict the expected
change in the exchange rate as a function of
the fundamentals level corresponding to different exchange-rate levels. When the
DM/$ rate was 1.77 so that the dollar was
weak, the intervention policy meant that the
dollar rate was expected to appreciate by
0.024 percent per day. Similarly, when the
dollar was at its maximum over the period,
intervention induced an expected 0.028-percent depreciation over the next day. To put
these estimates into perspective over this
period, these changes represented 5 percent
and 6.3 percent of the average appreciation
and depreciation, respectively, or 52 times
and 7 times the average exchange-rate
change. The effects of the intervention on
the yen are smaller. The expected apprecia-

tion of the dollar at its low end is only 0.3
percent of the average change, while that of
the expected depreciation at the high end is
0.1 percent. These estimates match the description in Yoichi Funabashi (1989) which
suggests that interventions against the yen
were largely to keep the dollar from falling
further.
To give some sense of the relative precision of the estimates, the top panel also
plots 2-standard-error bands based upon the
conditional-mean equation alone using the
joint-equation estimates.'7 These bands suggest that the conditional-mean estimates are
more precisely estimated for the deutsche
mark.

17These standard errors were based upon the first

equation alone and were calculated as SD(a1) (X'X)
where SD(a1) is the standard deviation of a1 and X is
the matrix of iT' observations. The true standard errors

are functions of all the equations in the system and
may be larger.
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The lower panels depict the estimates of
the conditional variances. Recall, however,
that the yen/$ estimates are insignificantly
different from zero in Table 4. Interestingly,
the DM/$ estimates show the pattern implied by the model. The variance is minimized at the upper and lower levels of the
exchange-rate range. To put these estimates
into perspective, the conditional standard
deviations of the DM/$ rate at its lower
and upper range, as percentages of the
overall standard deviation are 56 percent
and 59 percent, respectively. The yen/$
standard deviation is minimized at the lower
range of the exchange rate at 0.39, representing 33 percent of the standard deviation.
III. Relationship Between
the Occasional-Intervention Model
and Standard Models

I showed above how the exchange rate
would be affected by an intervention policy
characteristic of the behavior of the G-3
central banks during the late 1980's. The
Louvre Accord was followed by a period in
which these central bankers were perceived
as targeting rates and potentially keeping
these rates within bands.
The band behavior is a feature central to
all "target-zone" models, first described by

and applying Ito's lemma to XK yields:

(18) dxK = [ Xk((f) + 1r2Xji(f)] dt
+ rXk(f ) dz.
Substituting the expected exchange-rate
change from (18) into (1) gives the Krugman
solution.
Figure 2 demonstrates how the intervention model differs from the Krugman model
when both models incorporate the same

target bands as boundary conditions. First,
for identical fundamentals boundaries (f, f),
the implied bands of the exchange rates

with intervention probabilities wl or lr2 are
(xl, x1) or (x2, x2), respectively. These bands

are obviously tighter than the corresponding
Krugman bands (XK, XK). The intuition for
this result is clear. With the occasional intervention policy, the market believes that
central bankers will intervene to attenuate
movements away from the target level.
Therefore, when the exchange rate is above

xo, the present value of the expected future
path of excess money supply will be smaller
with occasional intervention than without it;
and vice versa when the exchange rate is

below xo. Hence, the bands are tighter.

Some of the features of exchange-rate
behavior when the fundamentals process is
distorted- by the occasional intervention rePaul Krugman (1991). Furthermore, some
semble those when fundamentals follow
of the empirical results found above may
a
seem consistent with these models as well.18 different mean-reverting process, the

It is therefore useful to contrast the occasional-intervention model and this popular
model.
A. Theoretical Comparison
The Krugman model assumes that funda-

Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process:

(19) df =-p(f-fo)dt + o-dz.
Defining xou = Xou(f) as the solution

generated by (19), Ito's lemma gives the
evolution of the exchange rate as

mentals evolve according to equation (2) but
have reflecting barriers at upper and lower
levels of fundamentals. Defining XK =

(20) dxou ={-P(f-fo)Xou(f)

XK(f) as the solution to equation (1), using
equation (2) as the fundamentals process,

+ 2o 2XJT(f)}dt

+ OrXou(f) dz.
18Svensson (1992) provides a critical survey of the Delgado and Dumas (1992) solve this probliterature.

lem in detail.
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A comparison of the O-U process in (19)
with the intervention-distorted fundamentals process in (6) shows their similarities
and differences. The size of the expected
change in the exchange rate is minimized at

fo for both cases. On the other hand, the
two processes differ in the effect of intervention upon the variance in the absence of
target bands. While the variance of the O-U
process is unaffected by intervention, targeting interventions locally to stabilize exchange rates tends to reduce the variance of
exchange rates as they move away from
fundamentals, as described in (6).

B. Do the Standard Target-Zone Models
Generate Nonlinearnties Empirically?
In Tables 3 and 4, I showed that the
behavior of exchange rates was consistent
with an intervention model without target
bands. However, these estimates may be
picking up relationships captured by one of

the two alternative processes above. Therefore, I also tested the null hypothesis of
linearities in conditional means based upon
these models.

From the Krugman exchange-rate process

in (18), the analogue to the intervention-

model conditional mean and variance in
(15) is

(21a) mX, K = ,UXK(f) +o2XK(f)

(21b) ax K =. ?2XK(f)2.
If bands are not present, then Xk(f) = 1,

If Xou(f) is relatively linear as when band

are not present, the conditional mean can
be written as

(24) (x,-x_1) =aO+a1ft_1 +ut
where aO = pfo and a1 = - pX'(f ). If not,
the linearity of equation (24) will be re-

jected.

Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of
C-D tests for nonlinearities arising from
these models against the null hypothesis of

(22) for the Krugman model and (24) for the
O-U model. As with the intervention model,
there is no evidence of nonlinearities arising
from a target band. All of the marginal
significance levels are greater than 10 percent.

To check for the power of the test statistic when bands are present in these models,
I conducted similar Monte Carlo experiments as in Table 3. I estimated a parametric version of the models using the
monetary fundamentals, as described in Appendix D. The nonlinearity parameters in
these estimates are all insignificantly different from zero, corroborating the evidence in
panel A of Table 5. I then used these estimates together with the restriction of reflecting barriers on the exchange rate to
provide data-generating processes for Monte
Carlo experiments on the C-D test statistic.
The parametric O-U model for the Japanese
yen did not converge, so that these Monte
Carlo experiments were not performed.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of

these experiments. For the available results,

XW(f) 0, and the conditional mean rethe C-D test statistics were never greater

duces to

than 5 percent, as for the occasionalintervention model. These results indicate
(22) (Xt-xt_l)ao+ut
that the C-D tests are quite powerful.
Therefore, standard target-zone models do
where ao = ,u. Similarly, for the O-U
not proappear to help explain the exchange-rate
cess in (20), the moments are:
behavior over the period.

(23a) mxou = - p(f-fO)XoU(f)

IV. Concluding Remarks and Directions
for Future Research

+ 14c 2X;U (f)

(23b) 0t2oU = 2Xou(f)2.

This paper has shown how an intervention policy characteristic of G-3 central
banks during the late 1980's would have
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TABLE 5-TESTS FOR NONLINEARITIES FROM STANDARD MODELS

A. Cleveland-Devlin Tests for Null Hypothesis of "Linear"Conditional Mean

DM/$ fundamentals Yen/$ fundamentals
Virtual

Model

Monetary

Krugman

a

=0

a

=3

Virtual

Monetary

a

=0

a

=3

0.608 0.118 0.123 0.279 0.640 0.140
(60) (134) (138) (75) (134) (61)

Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 0.520 0.616 0.398 0.193 0.583 0.248
(60) (134) (61) (82) (134) (61)

B.

Probability

of

Insignificant

Clevelan

DM/$ Yen/$
Krugman model

Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 0.000
Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 0.000
Omstein-Uhlenbeck model

Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than 5 percent: 0.000 N.A.
Proportion of times marginal significance level greater than estimate: 0.000 N.A.

Notes: For panel A, the entries are the marginal significance levels of the hypothesis
Krugman model and Axt = a0 + a,ft-1 + ut for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model are linea

in the column. These levels are the minimum levels over a grid search of neighborhood win
0.9 of the sample size, as described in Cleveland and Devlin (1988). The numbers in parenthe
observations in the window of the minimum marginal significance level.
Panel B reports the results of Monte Carlo experiments on monetary fundamentals. The models are estimated
parametrically as described in Appendix D. Using these estimates and imposing the assumption of bands at the
maximum exchange-rate levels over the sample, exchange rates and fundamentals were drawn for the length of the
sample, and C-D statistics were calculated. The table reports the proportion of times out of 1,000 replications that
the C-D F statistic from the generated model had a marginal significance level greater than 5 percent and greater
than the estimates in panel A for "monetary."

altered the behavior of foreign-exchange
demand relative to supply and, therefore,
exchange-rate behavior. The exchange-rate
solution in terms of its intervention-altered
fundamental determinants depends directly
upon the probability of intervention, which
can be estimated from observed intervention behavior. In the paper, this probability
was estimated jointly with the exchange-rate
behavior.

Interestingly, the evidence finds that intervention policy had a significant effect
upon the exchange rate during the Louvre
Accord period. On the other hand, the magnitudes of the intervention effects upon the
expected change in the exchange rate were
relatively small, particularly for the yen/$
exchange rate. The strongest effect of intervention policy was to reduce the variability

of the DM/$ exchange rate as it deviated
from the target level. Since the Louvre Accord was a period of active intervention
policy, these findings suggest that the effects of intervention, even if significant, are
likely to be even smaller in other episodes.
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE
INTERVENTION-DISTORTED PROCESS
IN EQUATION (6)

Equation (6) in the text provides a continuous-time approximation to the discretetime process for fundamentals in equation
(4) based upon the probability function in
equations (3) and (5). To see why, first
discretize the state-space of fundamentals
and redefine the fundamentals process in
(2) as k (= f) and write it as a binomial
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process. Thus, let k range over values such
that

where

a(f) = lim T'E{(Tf(nl+l)-Tfnx )I|Tnn}

(Al) kj- -ki = Vi

b(f)= lim T-nlE(( TfflT)I flT}

where starting at ki, a small period of time

r later one would have:

ki1 with probability p
kj 1 with probability q

where p = (1/2)[1 -( (cr/l)] and q =

(l1/2)[l +( ,r/f)]. Define the fundamen-

(see e.g., S. Karlin and H. M. Taylor, 1981).
Defining the standard Weiner process ob-

served over these intervals as TZ(n-l)T
TZnT ... the process using equation (4) can

be written as follows:

(A4) (rTnT + TZ(n+l)T + 1st

Tf(n+l)T= when no inte

tals process distorted by fundamentals to be

f(t). Then, if at time t, ki = fi, r periods

Tfn when interventio

later one would have

Note that the conditional mean at each
interval is

(A2) fi-I with probability p[l- W(kj_j)]discrete

fi + 1 with probability q [ l - w ( ki + 1 (AS) E [T-1 (Tf(n+l)T -TfnT)IT"nTj

fi with probability pTr(ki-1)
+ qv(ki+ ).
Thus, the probability of intervention in the
case of movements away from the band is

where rQnT is the sigma algebra genera-

ted by fiT Vi. This process is clearly

Markovian. From (A2), the expected evolu-

tion of the probability of intervention during T can also be written as a function of
the expected evolution of market fundamentals:

ITu = w1(ki+1), while the probability of intervention in case of movements toward the

(A6) 1( k(n+1) -)

band is ird = ir(ki-1). Clearly, then iTd < TU

as specified in equation (3).
Next, this discrete-time process may be
approximated as a continuous process by
taking the limit as the interval of time, r,
becomes small following the steps in Daniel
Nelson (1990). For this purpose, consider
now the changes in the original fundamentals and the intervention-distorted fundamentals over the interval of time r, and
index these processes according to the time

indexes Jff0 Tf9 Tf2Tr 9 rTnT and Tko, T7kT

- T 7 knT) + 7T'(TknT)(Tk(n+)T -TknT)
+ o(r)

where o(&) collects all terms that approach
zero faster than r. Then, substituting (A6)

and (A4) into (AS) and using the fact that,
conditional upon no interventions,
(T k(n+lTr-T knT ) = (Tf(nf+ I)T-TfT)

the conditional mean can be written as

Tk2T, ... , Tknrl. Define the family of sigma
algebras generated by the TfnT sequence as
rQnTr Finally, create the continuous-time (A7)
process as: Tft = TfnT. If it exists, the limit

E{T-'(-TZ(fn+l) + r)

diffusion has the following form:

x [1- 1(GknT) - 1'(TknT)

(A3) df = a(f) dt + b( f )'12dz

x ( Z(n+)T + Ir) + o( r) ITfln}
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For starting fundamentals level .rnT
= Xkn
Tr
proyides
the transitional
density for f E

taking the limit as r goes to zero
gives
(f,f):

(Bi) dp/ldt = (d2[b(f)f/ldf2)
(A8) lim E[r 'f(nf+l)T TfnfT)ITQflnI

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O'

-(d[a(f)p(f)]/df)-

= /.L(11T( f,))-'7T'(ft) Uf2.f
The conditional variance at each discrete
time interval is

For a stationary density, (dp/dt) = 0.
Therefore, setting the left-hand side of (Bi)
equal to zero and twice integrating implies

(B2) p(f) =m(f)[CjM(f)+ C2]

(A9) E [r' (7fk7 -Tf(k-1)T) 2kk l k

where

Substituting (A4) and (A6) into (A9) and

taking limits, the conditional variance is
given by

m(f) = b(f)exp[- f[2a( ~)Ib( )] d;

(A10) lim E [rI (JTkT - 1)k ) k2kTI
= [1-_(f)] L2.

Next, defining a(f) = ,u[1 - I7T(f)] -

M(f) = exp[-I [2a( ;)/b( 4)] dg dw

and where C1 and C2 are constants of integration that guarantee the following conditions:

7Tr(f)o-2, and b(f)=[1-7r(f)]o-2, and
substituting the result into (A3) above yields
(i) p(f) 2 0 Vf E (,f)
the form of the diffusion (6). If one restricts
IJ(f) to be continuous and differentiable
with bounded first derivatives Vf E (f, f), it
is straightforward to show that the regular(see e.g., Eugene Wong, 1964; Karlin and
ity conditions for nonexplosion given in
Taylor, 1981 pp. 219-21). Substituting for
Daniel Stroock and Srinavasa Varadhan
a(f) and b(f) yields

(1979) hold, and (6) is a diffusion process.
APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF EQUATION (6)

(B3) p(f) = [(1- r(f))]exp{(2,.L/or2)f}

x [c2 +cI fexp[ (2 /vQ)O ] d; ]

From Appendix A, write the diffusion
process in equation (6) in the following form:

df= a(f) dt + [b(f)] dz
where

For ,u = 0, the conditions above imply C1 = 0
since the integral is not bounded for ; large.
Condition (ii) implies that

C2= f|[l-r(;)] d;

a(f) -4[l - I(f)] - U2TV(f)

b(f) -2[1_7r(f)].

giving the distribution

Then the Fokker-Planck forward equation

p(f) = C2A1 -I(f)]-
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When #0, the distribution is given by
solving for C1 and C2 in (B3).

taking the first derivative of equation (C3):
(C4) X

APPENDIX C: CALCULATION OF
INTERVENTION PROBABILITY

(c1 - gl)exp(co + clst- )- g

AND ITS DERIVATIVE
Table 2 reports implied estimates of
probabilities of intervention and an estimated target level. The tests in Table 3 use
estimates of the probabilities of intervention reported in Table 2. Also, the singleequation and joint-equation estimations in
Table 4 use the form of the probability
function to construct the likelihood function. In all of these cases, the probability
function in (13) was used to provide estimates. This appendix details the form of the
probability function, IT*(x), and its derivative, w*'(x).
For wr*(x), first note that in equilibrium, 7r*(x)=IT*(x(s))=IrS(s) as described
in equations (12) and (12') in the text.
The probability of intervention is wrs(s)=

[1 + exp(co + clst- 1) + exp(go + glSt_ 1 )]
Finally, setting the derivative in (C4) equal

to zero, checking second-order conditions,
and solving for the st-1 gives the level of

the exchange rate with the lowest probabil-

ity of intervention. The functional form of

this exchange rate in terms of the parameters is given in equation (14) in the text, and
the estimates are reported in Table 2 under
the column "estimated target."
APPENDIX D: PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION

1. Krugman Model.-Svensson (1991)
shows that the solution to the exchange rate
is given by

Pr(I, = -1) + Pr(It = 1). Taking the expo-

nential of equations (13) and rearranging,
the probabilities can be rewritten as

(Cl) Pr(It=-1)
exp(co + clst-)
1+ exp(co + c,sts-) + exp(go + g1st- 1)
and

(D1) x = f + a 1 + Al exp(A1f)
+ A2 exp( A2f)

where A1 and A2 are constants of integration that depend upon two boundary conditions and the A1 are roots of the characteristic equation implied by these boundary
conditions. The expected change in the exchange rate is

(D2) Et(xt +I- xt)

(C2) Pr(It =1)

=[XK(f) - f]/a

= ,u + [Alexp(Alf) + A2exp(A2f)]/a.
1 + exp(co + clst-1) + exp(go + g1st-1)
Adding these probabilities together gives the
probability of intervention as

For the case when u =0 and bands are
symmetric, this expression reduces to

(D3) Et(xt+1-xt) =-sinh(Af)A
where A = [aAcosh(Af)]-' and A =

(C3) 7TS(s)

1+ exp(co + c1st, 1)

( 2/a)/o-. The conditional variance is

(D4) Et(x1tc-hxt
1+ exp(co + clst- 1 ) + exp(go + gst1)
To calculate the derivative of the probability, note that ir*'(x) = rs"(s(x))s'(x) =

irS'(s(x))exp(x). Then, irS' is calculated by

f 2

=f 0[XK,(f)12
= 'Gr2[j -A* cosh( Af)]2

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 85 NO. 4 LEWIS: OCCASIONAL INTERVENTIONS TO TARGETRATES 713

where A* = 2aAA. To check for nonlinearities arising from target zones as well as to
provide parameters for conducting the
Monte Carlo experiments, equations (D3)
and (D4) were estimated jointly with the
variance of fundamentals assuming innovations to the variances are lognormally distributed. Since a is not identified, the model
was estimated for a = 1 and a = 3 to check

Krugman nonlinearities. In this case, the
expected change in the exchange rate is

(D7) Et( xt+ - xt)

= [Xou(f) -fl/a
- P(f0 - f)/(1 + pa)

for robustness.

For this model, the estimates of the nonlinear term, A, were typically close to zero
and never significantly positive. The Monte

Carlo experiments used estimates of ,u and

o- and imposed the condition that f in the
boundary condition A corresponds to the
strongest value of the exchange rate over

+ Aou Jp(f. -f)sinh(Af)
where Aou = 2AA. This equation was estimated jointly with the variance of fundamentals and the process of fundamentals

given by

(D8) ft+1-ft =-p(ft-fO) +et+1 *

the period.

Similarly, the conditional variance is

2. OU Model.-The solution to the O-U
estimates are given in Delgado and Dumas
(1991) as

(D5) Xou(f)
=(f+ fpa)/(1+ pa)
+ A M[1/2 pa; 0.5; p(f0 _
+ A2M[(1 + pa)/2 pa; 1.5;

P(f _ f)2/0-2]
x 4-((fo - ff)/f/

u' 2[Xbu(f)]2. Under the assumption that

the nonlinearities of the O-U and the
Krugman model are the same, this equation
reduces to equation (D4).
As with the Krugman model, the estimates of the nonlinearity parameter, A,
were never significantly positive. The Monte

Carlo experiments use the estimates of fo,
o-, and p and impose the constraint that f

in A corresponds to the target-zone bands.

3. Intervention Model.-Although the
intervention model does not have a closedform solution, its form was approximated

for estimation purposes using equation (10)
where M[ *; -I is the confluent hypergeo- and assuming ,u = 0:
metric function and A1 and A2 are again
constants of integration. They show that
under symmetric bands A1 = 0, and this

(D9) Et(xt+l- xt)

= [X(f) -f]/a

solution reduces to

(D6) Xou (f )

=-2ir *t(X)[X,(f)]2

= (f + fo pa)/(1 + pa)
+ A2M[(1 + pa)/2 pa; 1.5;
Pfo-f) 2/co2J

+ ac.2(l-)X"(f).

Treating the target-zone nonlinearities as in
the Krugman model, this equation becomes

(D10) Et(xt+l- xt)

x Jj(fo - f)/ur
For the parametric estimation, these nonlinearities were treated as in the case of the

=-( 2ur*i (x) [1 -A* cosh( Af)]2
- (ao2(1- IT)A*Asinh( Af).

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:33:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

714 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 1995

Due to extreme multicollinearity between
the first and second terms in (D10), the
latter second-order terms were assumed to
be zero. The conditional variance is

(Dll) Et( xt+l1-xt)2

= 02(1 -lT)[X'(f)]2
= 0o2(1 -r) [1-A* cosh( Af)]2.
Equations (D10) and (Dll) were estimated
jointly with the conditional variance of fundamentals:

(D12) Et(ft+1 - ft) 2 = O'2(1 - W).
As with the other models, the estimates of
the target-band nonlinearity term, A, were
not significantly positive in any of the cases.
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